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ExtErnal IssuEs
u.s.-KOrEa ECOnOMIC rElatIOns: VIEW FrOM sEOul
By Han Dongman
Introduction
The year 2008 was one of exciting and important de-
velopments in both Korea and the United States, as 
well as in the two countries’ bilateral relationship.
Korea celebrated the 60th anniversary of the estab-
lishment of a modern democratic government, and 
it elected a new president. The United States also 
chose a new president, whose historically significant 
election was watched closely around the world.
Korea-U.S. bilateral relations grew closer than at 
any period in recent history. Major progress was 
made on several key alliance issues, such as the 
elevation of Korea’s foreign military sales status and 
Korea’s entrance into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. 
We also worked together on critical global issues, 
including the current financial crisis. That work 
continues as we gain a deeper understanding of our 
individual and joint needs and develop effective 
solutions to the problems we face.
The United States and Korea expanded ties to be-
come cooperative allies in a strategic relationship, 
which is important not only to both countries but to 
stability in the Northeast Asian region.
While the overall alliance was enhanced and 
remains strong, one aspect continues to present 
challenges—the economic relationship.
There are many ways to describe the U.S.-Korea 
economic bond—interdependent, complex, broad, 
robust, mutually beneficial. Perhaps “true partners” 
is the most accurate. Korea, which has a $1 trillion 
economy, is the seventh-largest trading partner of the 
United States—ahead of France, Spain, and India.
The U.S.-Korea bilateral economic relationship has 
evolved during the past years to the critical and very 
exciting point at which we now find ourselves. We 
stand at the threshold of a new chapter in U.S.-Korea 
relations with the potential to significantly and per-
manently upgrade not only our bilateral economic 
relations but our strategic ties as well.
Whether that chapter has a happy or disappointing 
ending is up to its “authors”—the members of the 
U.S. Congress who will decide the fate of the Korea-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).
Significance of the KORUS FTA
A fair and solid agreement with tremendous po-
tential to be quite beneficial to most businesses in 
both countries and, therefore, to their respective 
economies, the KORUS FTA by its sheer magnitude 
illustrates the scope of the U.S.-Korea economic 
relationship. The KORUS FTA marks a significant 
decision to upgrade the bilateral economic relation-
ship to a higher level in the twenty-first century—
one worthy of the true partnership that has evolved 
in recent years.
Interestingly, the KORUS FTA is not a vehicle for 
only economic gains. Indeed, it can also usher in 
a whole new era in our bilateral security relations, 
anchoring the military alliance on a firm social and 
economic basis. The KORUS FTA can ensure that 
our partnership continues to have a wide, firm, and 
deep support base in each country.1
1. Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak, stipulated the benefits of the KORUS FTA in his speech on 17 April 2008 during a din-
ner hosted by U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
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That is why the future of the KORUS FTA is one of 
the most important issues that the United States and 
Korea face in their relationship at this time.
It has been more than a year and a half since Korea 
and the United States signed the KORUS FTA on 30 
June 2007. Although a broad swath of the business 
community and agricultural groups in the United 
States supports the agreement, some members of 
Congress from the Democratic Party and some 
labor unions have expressed their concerns about 
the adequacy of the KORUS FTA to address market 
access issues in the Korean market, particularly for 
U.S.-made cars.
In its blueprint for the Obama administration, the 
Center for American Progress Action Fund—a gen-
erally pro–Democratic Party think tank founded by 
John Podesta, a former chief of staff to President Bill 
Clinton—urged resolution of both the U.S. beef and 
auto export issues, warning that “without progress 
on these fronts, Congress is unlikely to support the 
Agreement.”
The blueprint went on to say, “The job of the new 
President and his Secretary of State will be to ex-
plain to the Korean leaders and citizens why these 
issues are so important to Congress and the Ameri-
can people, while at the same time explaining to 
Congress and the American people the importance 
of the KORUS FTA to U.S. economic and foreign 
policy and economic objectives.”2
U.S. Beef Is Entering the Korean Market
When a case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(commonly referred to as BSE or mad-cow disease) 
was detected in the state of Washington in De-
cember 2003, as a precautionary measure Korean 
authorities stopped importing beef from the United 
States, which had been the largest provider of beef 
to Korea at that time, with 67 percent beef import 
market share.3
Even though the U.S. beef quarantine issue is a 
public health issue more than it is a trade issue and 
is not a part of the KORUS FTA, it was believed to 
be a stumbling block to congressional approval of 
the agreement in the United States.
After the May 2007 decision of the World Organiza-
tion for Animal Health to classify the United States 
as a BSE risk-controlled country, the two govern-
ments conducted negotiations to amend the U.S. 
beef import protocol in a way that strikes a mutually 
acceptable balance.
When the Korean government lifted its ban on 
imports of U.S. beef in April 2008, anti–U.S. beef 
protests in Korea erupted. The rallies were spurred 
by Internet rumors and sensational reports that Ko-
reans were genetically susceptible to the mad-cow 
disease.
Despite the unprecedented political turmoil and in-
tense pressure over several months, the Korean gov-
ernment held firm. It did not succumb to demands 
for a renegotiation of the beef import deal.
Consumption of U.S. beef declined during that 
period, but U.S. beef is now arriving in the Korean 
marketplace without major technical difficulties, and 
it accounts for almost 60 percent of the imported 
beef market share as Korea’s top imported meat as 
of October 2008.
U.S. Automobile Sector Stands to Gain 
Immensely from KORUS FTA
Opponents of approval of the KORUS FTA also 
focused on the auto trade imbalance, but, as the 
United States Trade Representative has emphasized 
many times, Korea has incorporated a majority of 
the U.S. demands to create a level playing field for 
U.S.-made autos in Korea.
2. Ira Shapiro and Richard Samans, “Office of the United States Trade Representative: Responding to the Changing Global 
Challenge,” in Change for America: A Progressive Blueprint for the 44th President, ed. Mark Green and Michele Jolin (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2008), http://images2.americanprogress.org/CAPAF/2008/changeforamerica/
Econ_08_Shapiro_Samans.pdf.
3. Data are from the National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service, Republic of Korea.
055-063_Han.indd   56 5/26/2009   11:02:32 AM
EXTERNAL ISSUES                      57
Specifically, Korea agreed to eliminate its 8 percent 
tariff on U.S. passenger cars immediately, to reduce 
the discriminatory effects of its engine displace-
ment taxes, to amend emissions standards for some 
U.S.-exported cars, and to allow the United States to 
return to or “snap back” tariffs on cars to their former 
tariff level if Korea does not abide by its commit-
ments on auto trade under the KORUS FTA.
The United States agreed to eliminate immediately 
its 2.5 percent tariff on Korean passenger vehicles 
with engines smaller than 3,000 cubic centimeters 
and to phase out, over 10 years, the 25 percent tariff 
on pickup trucks.
Notwithstanding all of these concessions, the U.S. 
auto industry—with the exception of General Motors 
(GM)—several labor unions, and some Democratic 
members of Congress have voiced strong opposition 
to the auto provisions of the KORUS FTA and have 
held up its approval in the U.S. Congress.
This continues to frustrate the agreement’s sup-
porters because the reality is that the agreement 
addresses the concerns raised by the United States 
in the automotive sector and contains strong and 
unprecedented measures to ensure greater access to 
the Korean market by the U.S. automakers.4
Consider the following:
Fact 1: Korea’s market is open for imports and 
foreign ownership. Rates of both have been increas-
ing. Contrary to what opponents claim, the fact is 
that Korea is already moving in the right direction: 
the market share of foreign vehicles in terms of the 
number of vehicles sold in Korea in 2008 was 6.04 
percent (61,648 cars), an increase of 16.5 percent 
compared with 2007 (53,390 cars).
Since 2000, the market share of foreign automak-
ers in terms of sales value has been increasing 
by an average of 41.9 percent annually. The U.S. 
automotive industry exported 8,864 cars to Korea 
in 2008, an increase of 8.4 percent compared with 
8,172 cars in 2007.5
Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) and Japan 
continue to take advantage of current market op-
portunities. They do significantly better than U.S. 
manufacturers in Korea: in 2008, the EU sold five 
times and Japan sold almost three times as many 
automobiles as the United States. Sales by the EU 
and Japan suggest there may be factors at work other 
than the alleged closed nature of the Korean market 
that are impeding U.S. auto sales in Korea.
Faced with competition from Japanese and Eu-
ropean imports in recent years, U.S. automobiles 
have experienced a declining market share in Korea. 
According to the Korea Automobile Importers and 
Distributors Association (KAIDA), the U.S. share 
of the imported-auto market was 28 percent in 2003. 
It dipped to 15 percent in 2004 and then to 11.7 
percent in 2007.6
If one compares the market share of the Korean and 
the U.S. brands in the other country’s market, the 
market share of the U.S. brands in Korea reached 
11.3 percent in 2008 while the Korean brands ac-
counted for 5.1 percent of the U.S. auto market, a 
very small percentage compared with the Japanese 
brands, which captured 39.5 percent in 2008.
The Korean government stands ready to ensure that 
the potential of the KORUS FTA is realized for 
U.S. auto producers through strict adherence to its 
commitments and marketing assistance to support 
public openness to imports.
Fact 2: The argument of unbalanced auto trade 
did not reflect the sales of GM-Daewoo, and Ko-
rea is not the main source of the U.S. auto trade 
deficit. The most vocal complaint about U.S.-Korea 
4. Korean Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon said in his interview with Korea’s Yonhap News Agency on 16 January 2009: “If the 
U.S. automakers want to increase their market share in Korea, the KORUS FTA would be a good opportunity for them. All the 
things they have sought for years are put into the pact. Renegotiation of the KORUS FTA would not be sensible.” 
5. Data are from the Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association.
6. The shares of the United States, the EU, and Japan in the Korean market for imported automobiles in 2008 were 11.3 percent, 
53.6 percent, and 35.1 percent, respectively; see data from KAIDA.
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automobile trade is that it is “unfairly” unbalanced. 
The numbers cited vary significantly, but the most 
typical claim is that Korea exports about 700,000 
cars annually to the United States, while the United 
States is “permitted” to export only a few thousand 
to Korea.
The total number of Korean nameplate vehicles 
sold in the United States in 2008 was 675,139, 
which comprised domestic production in Alabama 
(188,351, 29.9 percent) and imports from Korea 
(486,788, 70.1 percent).
It is important to look beyond these numbers. On the 
Korean side of the ledger, one has to understand that 
the whole Korean market is about 1.2 million cars 
per year. This compares with a U.S. market of about 
15 million cars per year. Just on the differing market 
sizes alone, it is not surprising that sales numbers are 
not equivalent; the market sizes are not equivalent. 
Note also that three Korean automakers are owned 
by foreign companies, including General Motors, 
which purchased Daewoo in 2001.
Sales of automobiles of foreign-owned automobile 
manufacturers (such as GM-Daewoo) and of im-
ported cars combined account for about 28 percent 
of the total domestic market share in Korea.
In fact, Korea is not a leading source of the U.S. 
auto trade deficit. According to U.S. Department 
of Commerce statistics for 2008, the United States 
recorded an automobile trade deficit of $40.7 bil-
lion with Japan, $17.2 billion with Mexico, $13.4 
billion with Canada, and $10.1 billion with Germany 
compared with $7.1 billion with Korea. The trade 
deficit with Korea dropped by 9.6 percent compared 
with the previous year.7
Meanwhile, Korean companies operate automobile 
manufacturing plants in the United States. The 
Hyundai plant in Alabama is a $1.4 billion invest-
ment and has created about 3,300 new jobs. The 
Kia plant in Georgia, expected to be in operation by 
2009, is a $1.2 billon investment that will generate 
approximately 2,500 new jobs.
Fact 3: The FTA comprehensively addresses non-
tariff barriers in Korea. Korea agreed to change 
the taxation system to address U.S. concerns about 
nontariff barriers.
First, Korea agreed to overhaul its automotive taxa-
tion system: Korea will simplify its engine displace-
ment taxation system so that larger vehicles will 
not be liable to pay higher taxes. Korea also agreed 
not to introduce new engine displacement taxes to 
increase the disparity of tax rates between catego-
ries. Korea will go beyond that and further eliminate 
alleged discriminating aspects of the special con-
sumption and vehicle taxes and will simplify and 
significantly reduce existing tax rates—immediately 
cutting some in half.
Second, Korea has agreed to provide special treat-
ment for U.S. automakers with regard to emissions 
standards.
Third, Korea will grant a grace period to U.S. 
automakers in applying new safety standards and 
technical requirements.
Last, and most important, through various transpar-
ency provisions of the FTA, Korea will give the U.S. 
auto industry a voice in the discussion and imple-
mentation of future standards and requirements.
Fact 4: The FTA includes a powerful enforcement 
mechanism. The agreement also establishes specific 
dispute settlement procedures for automobiles. If 
either country is found to be in violation of the agree-
ment, the FTA provides a unique fast-track dispute 
settlement procedure in which tariffs of passenger 
cars may snap back to pre-FTA levels. Thus, penal-
ties may be disproportionate to any harm caused by 
the breach of the commitments. This provides an 
added incentive for full compliance.
It is a creative and unprecedented enforcement 
mechanism, showing Korea’s strong commitment 
to the auto sector. In most FTAs, it can often take 
months or even years for the dispute settlement 
process to reach an outcome. Recognizing the sen-
7. U.S. trade flows by all shippers of road motor vehicles (in billions of current dollars) in the U.S. motor vehicle industry, 
domestic and international trade, compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Aerospace and Automotive Indus-
tries, from government and industry sources, 2008.
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sitivities in automotive trade and the importance of 
reaching a decision as promptly as possible, the KO-
RUS FTA has introduced a speedy new system.
The Automotive Working Group is another innova-
tive approach to safeguarding the U.S. and Korean 
automotive industries from issues that may arise in 
the future. It will act as an early-warning system 
of potential concerns, pinpointing and addressing 
potential regulatory issues before they become prob-
lematic. A panel such as this is unprecedented and 
demonstrates Korea’s commitment to fairness.
Fact 5: Not all of the U.S. auto industry is op-
posed to the Korea-U.S. FTA. General Motors is 
officially neutral but has stated in its Industry Trade 
Advisory Committee report that “GM believes 
that the KORUS FTA has addressed the U.S. auto 
industry’s concerns.”8
The American International Automobile Dealers As-
sociation, which represents 11,000 auto franchises 
and whose members provide more than 500,000 U.S. 
jobs, supports the KORUS FTA. The Association of 
International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM) 
also supports KORUS FTA. AIAM’s members have 
invested more than $33 billion in 47 U.S. vehicle 
plants, component manufacturing facilities, and 
centers for research and development, which employ 
almost 100,000 Americans.
The U.S. auto parts industry has not opposed the 
agreement.
Fact 6: The KORUS FTA is the only World Trade 
Organization (WTO)–consistent way forward in 
the automotive sector. Opponents of the KORUS 
FTA have proposed an alternative approach based 
on a product-specific reciprocal trading regime put 
forward in a letter from some members of the House 
of Representatives and the Senate to President 
George W. Bush in March 2007.
This so-called March 2007 proposal features the 
following elements: First, it proposes for the auto-
motive sector a car-for-car reciprocal application 
of the KORUS FTA tariff concessions. That is, for 
every additional car shipped by the United States to 
Korea, Korea will get a tariff break on one vehicle 
shipped to the United States. Second, this proposal 
contains a punitive enforcement mechanism that 
would apply not just to the automotive sector but 
to all products.
Under this portion of the proposal, the United States 
could unilaterally snap back tariffs at any time if it 
considered that Korea was not fulfilling its obliga-
tions or was undercutting the United States with 
the use of other steps such as technical barriers. It 
would then be Korea’s burden to prove that it had 
not taken any such steps.
The Korean and U.S. negotiators did not include 
these elements because they are inconsistent with 
both the law and policy of the WTO and the spirit 
of free trade.
First, the product-specific reciprocal tariff proposal 
operates as a tariff rate quota (TRQ). That is, there 
would be duty-free treatment for the number of 
Korean autos that corresponded to the increase in 
exports of U.S. automobiles. TRQs are inconsistent 
with Article XI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) when applied to industrial 
goods.
From the trade policy perspective, the alternative 
proposal is badly flawed. Just as Korea would not 
get tariff preferences for cars that it ships in excess 
of cars shipped by the United States, it is unques-
tionable that Korean interest groups would demand 
that the United States not gain privileges in corn, 
oilseeds, poultry, pork, citrus, or certain types of 
machinery and chemicals unless Korea also exported 
equivalent amounts of those specific goods, calcu-
lated on a product-by-product basis.
The product-specific reciprocal trading scheme 
would open a Pandora’s box of managed trade. It 
is a simple and long-standing proposition that the 
market access and national treatment provisions of 
the GATT and WTO do not guarantee market shares 
of anything. Rather, it is competitive opportunities 
that are protected.
8. Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Automotive Equipment and Capital Goods (ITAC 2), 27 April 2007.
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Second, the proposal for a unilateral enforcement 
mechanism is a repetition of the old Section 301 of 
the Trade Act of 1974, which was found illegal in its 
original form by a WTO dispute panel. It proposed 
an enforcement mechanism backed up by a dispute 
settlement process that reverses the burden of proof 
and would require Korea to prove the negative, that 
is, that it was not guilty.
It is a fundamental precept of law that the party as-
serting the illegality of an action has the burden of 
proving its case. This unilateralist proposal, how-
ever, would undermine the principles of due process 
and the rule of law that the United States agrees are 
the most fundamental aspects of the WTO system.
Simply put, without the KORUS FTA, U.S. auto 
manufacturers will continue to face the same tariff 
and nontariff barriers. With the KORUS FTA, U.S. 
automakers will obtain important access to the 
Korean automotive market through the elimination 
of a wide range of tariff and nontariff measures, 
enforceable under a unique and expedited dispute 
settlement mechanism.9
In its independent study, the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission (USITC) confirmed 
that the removal of the 8 percent tariff on U.S. pas-
senger cars would likely have a positive effect on 
U.S. exports, potentially enabling U.S. exporters to 
lower their prices because of the tariff elimination. 
Moreover, the USITC expects a negligible impact 
on U.S. employment, as any increase in U.S. im-
ports of Korean passenger cars would be small in 
percentage terms.
Trade Saves the Day
The recent unprecedented global financial turmoil 
has led to the concern that many countries will be 
tempted to resort to protectionism to revitalize their 
domestic markets. Although that might be under-
standable, it would not be effective. The fact is that 
trade in a fair and free market plays an important 
role in economic stability. Knowing this, the Group 
of Twenty (G-20) leaders reconfirmed the spirit of 
free trade and the market-economy system during a 
summit in Washington, D.C., in November 2008.
At that summit, President Lee Myung-bak called 
for a “standstill” for world trade and investment 
barriers. Following his lead, the 21 leaders at the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting held 
in Peru on 23 November 2008 endorsed the G-20 
agreement to resist domestic pressure to protect 
industries by refraining for 12 months from raising 
new barriers to investment or from imposing new 
export restrictions on trade in goods and services. 
In the second G-20 meeting, held in London on 2 
April 2009, the leaders reaffirmed the commitment 
made in Washington to refrain from raising new 
barriers to investment or to trade in goods and 
services, from imposing new export restrictions, or 
from implementing WTO-inconsistent measures to 
stimulate exports.
Since the housing and financial crises erupted in 
mid-2007, there has been a decline in final domes-
tic demand. The export boom has saved the U.S. 
economy from recession during the past year, how-
ever, and, despite the recent financial turmoil, it is 
likely to continue doing so. The boom in exports has 
generated at least two million new and high-paying 
jobs, about half of them from increased foreign sales 
by the beleaguered manufacturing sector.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development foresees continued modest expan-
sion of the U.S. economy during 2008–09, with 
80 percent of the impetus coming from trade im-
provement.10
Recently, trade has been a bulwark for the U.S. econo-
my as it has slowed and headed into recession. During 
the year prior to the recent financial crisis, exports were 
generating nearly all U.S. economic growth.11
9. See “KORUS FTA: Opportunities for Automotive Exports,” KORUS FTA Facts, Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative, October 2008, www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2008/asset_upload_file500_15206.pdf.
10. See C. Fred Bergsten, “Trade Saves the Day,” Washington Post, 17 September 2008.
11. “International Engagement: The U.S. Chamber’s Agenda to Help Americans Compete and Win in the Worldwide Economy” 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, December 2008), 8.
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Exports have been an incredibly powerful source of 
economic growth, prosperity, and competitiveness 
in the U.S. economy. It is a symbol of U.S. open-
ness, leadership, and engagement in the world that 
its trade surplus with the country partners of the 11 
FTAs in force grew from $3.8 billion in 2000 to $21 
billion in 2007.
The December 2008 report, “U.S. International 
Trade in Goods and Services,” by the U.S. Census 
Bureau shows that U.S. exports of goods and ser-
vices grew by 12 percent in 2008 to $1.84 trillion, 
and that the U.S. goods and services trade deficit 
($39.9 billion) was the lowest monthly deficit since 
February 2003.
Vigorous trade will help the world recover. For that 
to happen, the United States will have to provide 
strong leadership and a clear commitment to fight 
protectionism.12
Implications of the KORUS FTA
Although a basic objective of this FTA initiative is to 
secure global market access for Korean industries so 
that they can gain an edge over competitors, that is 
not the sole purpose of the agreement. The broader 
goal is to upgrade the Korean economy by opening 
the domestic market to open competition.
Trade and investment liberalization bring about 
higher global standards and a transparent business 
environment, driving Korea to achieve greater ef-
ficiency and serving as the aspired springboard to 
becoming an advanced economy adhering to global 
rules. The deal will also serve as testimony to Ko-
rea’s unshakable commitment to economic growth 
through open markets.
For the United States, the KORUS FTA will make 
Korea an even more attractive place to do business, 
expanding economic opportunities for U.S. manu-
facturers, workers, and farmers.
A congressionally mandated study by the USITC 
concluded that, under the KORUS FTA, U.S. exports 
of goods to Korea would likely increase by about 
$10 billion, primarily in agricultural products, ma-
chinery, electronics, and transportation equipment. 
In addition, the study noted that U.S. exports in 
services would increase as a result of Korean com-
mitments under the KORUS FTA and that changes 
in the regulatory environment would also help to 
increase bilateral trade and investment flows.
By approving the KORUS FTA, Congress will 
create new opportunities for prosperity for U.S. 
workers, businesses, and consumers, and the U.S. 
economy will be strengthened.13
Korea is a large and growing market for U.S. export-
ers and a good economic and policy partner of the 
United States. The KORUS FTA gives the United 
States a framework for a better, more open place 
to do business with a strong economic foothold in 
Asia.14
Korea is a vital force for stability at a time of great 
challenge and change on the Korean peninsula and 
in the broader Northeast Asia region. The KORUS 
FTA will strengthen the critical U.S. strategic part-
nership with Korea. By boosting economic ties and 
broadening and modernizing the long-standing alli-
ance, it promises to become the pillar of the bilateral 
alliance for the next 50 years, as the Mutual Defense 
Treaty has been for the past 50 years.15
Cost of Inaction
Failure to ratify the KORUS FTA would have seri-
ous consequences. U.S. companies would lose mar-
12. “Mr. Obama’s Trade Agenda” (editorial), New York Times, 11 March 2009.
13.  According to the Washington Times on 14 November 2008, there should be no fear that U.S. companies will relocate to 
Korea at the expense of U.S. workers because Korea is not a low-wage nation. The KORUS FTA will create jobs for both 
Americans and Koreans.
14. “Helping U.S. Companies Export,” U.S. Department of Commerce, www.export. gov.
15. “KORUS FTA Facts,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, October 2008.
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ket share in Korea. Korea’s FTA negotiations with 
the EU are expected to finish in May 2009.16
A long delay or rejection of the KORUS FTA 
would have an adverse macroeconomic impact on 
both countries. The most evident effect of a delay 
or rejection would be on the size and patterns of 
trade and investment flows. The delay’s impact 
would be greater on those sectors primed to gain 
the most. In the United States, agriculture would 
feel the impact as high Korean tariffs on fruits and 
vegetables and quotas on dairy products and meats 
would continue.
Reduction in Korea’s restrictions on financial, pro-
fessional, and other services would stall, affecting 
U.S. providers’ efforts to increase their presence in 
that market.
In addition to the impact on trade and investment 
flows, a long delay or rejection of the KORUS FTA 
could heighten tensions in the bilateral economic 
relationship. The KORUS FTA was intended as a 
mechanism to address or resolve issues that have 
hampered the relationship for many years and as a 
forum to handle future economic issues before they 
threaten the overall relationship. If the KORUS FTA 
collapses, the political environment surrounding 
U.S.-Korea economic relations could sour, mak-
ing it more difficult for issues to be addressed and 
resolved.17
Yes, We Can
It is hoped that the new president and the U.S. trade 
representative will address the concerns that leave 
some uncomfortable with supporting ratification of 
the KORUS FTA.
The trade pact would be good for the U.S. economy 
and U.S. workers. Rejecting it would send an un-
welcome message to allies around the world that the 
United States is an unreliable partner and, despite all 
that it preaches, does not really believe in opening 
markets to trade.
The Center for American Progress Action Fund 
advised in its Change for America: A Progressive 
Blueprint for the 44th President that because of 
expectations already raised, if the KORUS FTA is 
mishandled, there could be a very detrimental effect 
on the overall U.S. position in Asia.
During the meeting between President Barack 
Obama and President Lee Myung-bak on 2 April 
2009 on the sidelines of G-20 meeting, the two 
presidents agreed that the KORUS FTA could 
bring benefits to both countries and committed to 
working together to chart a way forward. It is our 
hope that the two countries work expeditiously 
to reach an agreement on the pending issues in a 
mutually acceptable manner based upon the spirit 
of strengthening the bilateral alliance.
Yes, we can, and we must seize this moment to make 
our relationship the best it can be. An opportunity 
such as this is not likely to come again. There is no 
more time to waste.
Prospects for 2009
There is now broad consensus that 2009 will see a 
global recession. In such an environment, it is es-
sential that international economic cooperation be 
sustained and strengthened. One of the best ways 
to do that would be early ratification of the KORUS 
FTA.
Korea, after experiencing very rapid economic de-
velopment over the past half century and successful 
recovery from the financial crisis in 1997, currently 
holds a strong position as a principal industrial 
power. Having this experience, Korea, Asia’s 4th-
largest and the world’s 13th-largest economy, has 
been trying to serve as the mediator or the bridge 
linking developed and developing countries.
16. The EU is Korea’s second-largest trading partner after China. Trade between Korea and the EU reached $98 billion in 2008, 
and the EU is the largest foreign investor in Korea.
17. Mark Manyin, “Can the U.S. and South Korea Sing without KORUS? The Economic and Strategic Effects on the KORUS 
FTA” (presentation at the 19th U.S.-Korea Academic Symposium, New York University, 16–18 September 2008), 15–16.
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Ultimately, the United States will be the central 
player in bringing about the recovery of the world 
economy. Korean businesses and the government 
are optimistic that the new U.S. administration will 
move quickly and decisively to create and imple-
ment a plan to resolve the global financial crisis.
As we have done for more than a half century, Korea 
will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with the 
United States as close allies with common goals, 
working together on global issues, while deepening 
our bilateral ties.
Mr. Han is Minister Counselor at the Republic of 
Korea’s embassy in Washington, D.C. The views in 
this article represent his own and not necessarily 
those of the embassy or the Korean government.
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